Standards · Wi-Fi credential QR

Is this Wi-Fi QR code safe to scan?

A Wi-Fi QR joins your phone to whatever network name is inside the code, full stop. The danger isn't the QR format (it's standardized and harmless on its own), it's the SSID. A QR with a name like "Starbucks-WiFi-Free" plausibly routes you to a fake hotspot in the parking lot. The defense is reading the network name BEFORE you tap Connect.

Inspect a Wi-Fi QR → All standards →

What's the format

The standard is the WIFI: URI scheme, originally introduced by the ZXing project and adopted by the Wi-Fi Alliance. A complete payload looks like:

WIFI:T:WPA2;S:CafeWiFi;P:hunter2;H:false;;

The fields are key-value pairs separated by semicolons. Every modern smartphone camera app recognizes this format and prompts to join the network.

For WPA2-Enterprise (corporate or campus Wi-Fi), the format extends with three more fields, EAP method (PEAP / TLS / TTLS), identity (your username), anonymous identity (the outer EAP identity), and phase-2 authentication method.

Field-by-field

T, security type

WPA, WPA2, WPA3, WEP, or nopass (open). WEP is broken, modern phones may refuse to connect. nopass means the network is open with no encryption at the link layer.

S, SSID (network name)

The network name your phone displays after connecting. The most important field to verify. Compare against what the venue advertises in print or on signage.

P, password

The pre-shared key for WPA-class networks. Absent for nopass.

H, hidden network

true if the network doesn't broadcast its SSID. Hidden networks need to be searched for; not inherently more secure, often less.

E, EAP method (Enterprise)

For WPA2/3-Enterprise networks: PEAP, TLS, TTLS, PWD. Determines how your phone authenticates to the network's auth server.

I, Identity (Enterprise)

Your username on the Enterprise network. Some venues encode a guest identity here; corporate networks expect your real username.

A, Anonymous Identity (Enterprise)

The outer identity visible during the EAP handshake. Used for privacy, the real identity is encrypted inside the tunnel.

PH2, Phase 2 method (Enterprise)

For TTLS / PEAP: the inner-tunnel authentication method, usually MSCHAPV2.

The evil-twin attack

The recipe:

  1. Attacker sets up a Wi-Fi router (or a phone in hotspot mode) near a target venue, a coffee shop, airport gate, hotel lobby, conference centre.
  2. They configure the SSID to match or mimic the venue's network: Starbucks_WiFi_2, FREE_AIRPORT_WIFI, HotelGuests_5G.
  3. They print a QR for that fake network and stick it somewhere plausible, under a table edge, next to a power outlet, on a window.
  4. You scan, your phone joins their hotspot. The attacker proxies your traffic to the real internet so nothing feels broken, but they see every HTTPS handshake's SNI hostname (which sites you visit), every DNS query, and any unencrypted traffic.

Modern apps use HTTPS so credentials and content are encrypted. But:

Our scanner flags SSIDs that look like high-mimicry targets, well-known brand names with confusables decoded, as suspicious so you double-check the network name before joining.

What our scanner shows you

Drop a Wi-Fi QR (image, paste, or camera) into our scanner. The verdict shows:

The scanner runs in your browser; only the decoded text reaches our server for the safety check, not the image.

Before you tap Connect

Related

Inspect a Wi-Fi QR

Drop the QR image, paste the WIFI: string, or use the camera. Verdict shows network name, security type, masked password, and flags lookalikes against high-mimicry brand SSIDs.

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